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We present an overview of models of long-term self-enforcing labor contracts in which risk 
sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed which is 
sufficiently general to encompass the two-agent problem central to most of the literature, 
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In this paper we consider long-term risk-sharing1 labor contracts under limited
commitment. Firms and workers are allowed to sign, or implicitly agree to, contingent
contracts but also to renege on these contracts when it is to their advantage. That is to
say, there are no courts to enforce contracts and low mobility or “lock-in” costs. We ﬁrst
develop a general framework for analyzing contracts in this class of repeated interac-
tions. The logic of these contracts follows that of repeated games, in that a party called
upon to sacriﬁce current utility to maintain the insurance is prepared to do so in antic-
ipation of receiving reciprocal beneﬁts in the future. However in general ﬁrst-best risk
sharingcannotbeachieved, anditiswhathappensinthesecondbestcontractswhichis
of particular interest. What then follows is a selective overview of the existing literature
that considers both the implications for empirical testing and summaries the available
empirical evidence.
The study of long-term labor contracts with limited commitment is important be-
causeotherstandardmodelsofthelabormarketcannoteasilyaccountforobservedpat-
terns in the data. The data typically show that real wages are only weakly correlated with
productivity or even mildly countercyclical. Hours on the other hand are found to be
quite strongly positively correlated with productivity. To match this observed pattern in
the data using standard real business cycle models requires a very high intertemporal
elasticity of substitution for labor supply that is not supported by estimates from micro
data. Recently Shimer (2005) has suggested that standard search models under-predict
the volatilities of vacancies and unemployment because of the ﬂexibility of wage re-
sponses to productivity under Nash bargaining unless implausibly large shocks for pro-
ductivity are assumed. We therefore consider some of the available empirical evidence
on whether these puzzles might be resolved within the limited commitment labor con-
tracting model.
Westartbydevelopingabasictwo-agent(worker-ﬁrm)modelinwhicheitheragent
can quit the relationship at any time either at a positive or zero cost. The agents agree
initially to a contingent sequence of wages (and potentially a termination rule) which
satisﬁes certain incentive or participation constraints. The outside environment is sum-
marized by the evolution of the respective outside options for the two agents. The basic
characterization of second-best contracts can then be applied to speciﬁc models, and
we do this to summaries the existing theoretical work in the area. In the development of
the model we do not use the dynamic programming framework that is usually employed
for this environment, but instead show that the model can be solved by using local vari-
ational arguments, thus avoiding the need to establish a number of technical properties
of value functions.
1Thuswedonotconsidertheothermuchanalyzedmotiveforcontracting,namelytoprotectrelationship
speciﬁc investments from opportunistic behavior. For a discussion of this, see MacLeod (2007).
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Althoughthebasiccharacterizationsofthesecond-bestcontractshavebeenknown
forsometime,inthesecondpartofthepaperweconsiderhowtheoutsideoptionsofthe
agents can be made endogenous in search equilibrium models or competitive models
with perfect labor mobility. There has been a recent upsurge of interest in applications
of this type of model to macroeconomics, and of testing of the model particularly in the
one-sided limited commitment case where workers are mobile but ﬁrms can commit.
We summaries the main ﬁndings of the literature and the empirical evidence which is
generally very supportive of the one-sided model.
2. A GENERAL MODEL OF LIMITED COMMITMENT
This section considers a general model of limited commitment. We ﬁrst derive the
implications of optimum contracting in a simple model with ﬁxed hours in Section 2.1
and consider the empirical test of the model given in Macis (2006). The remaining sub-
sections then consider various extensions of the basic model. Section 2.2 considers the
modiﬁcation of the model when hours are variable and reports on the results of Beaudry
& DiNardo (1995) on the implied negative correlation between hours and wages. Sec-
tion 2.3 discuses the role of ex ante or up-front payments between the worker and the
ﬁrm and Section 2.4 examines the some further implications of quitting or reneging
costs.
2.1. A baseline model
The model is as follows.2 There is an inﬁnite horizon, t = 1,2,3...∞. Workers are
risk-aversewithper-periodtwicedifferentiableutilityfunctionu(c),u0 >0,u00 <0,where
c ≥0istheincome/consumptionofthesinglegoodreceivedwithintheperiod; crucially,
it is assumed that they cannot make capital market transactions, so the only possibility
for consumption smoothing across states of nature or over time arises if the ﬁrm pro-
vides insurance. There is no disutility of work, but hours are ﬁxed so that workers are
either employed or unemployed (although we relax the assumption of ﬁxed hours be-
low). The ﬁrm is assumed to be risk-neutral. We consider a single match between one
worker and one ﬁrm,3 and for the moment we do not need to ﬁll in the details of the
outside environment. There is perfect information within the match. We suppose that
outputattime t withinthismatchis z(st)≥0,where st isthecurrentstateofnature.4 The
state of nature st follows a time-homogeneous Markov process, with ﬁnite state space S,
and initial distribution p over S, and from state s state r ∈S is reachable next period with
2A description of a general limited commitment model of risk sharing can be found in Ljungqvist & Sar-
gent (2004, Chapter 20).
3That is we shall treat contracts between each ﬁrm and worker separately. The case where contracts with
different workers cannot be treated separately is studied in Martins, Snell & Thomas (2005) and Snell &
Thomas (2006) and discussed brieﬂy in Section 2.4.
4We do not identify the state of nature directly with productivity, z, as it may be that other ﬁrms face
different productivity shocks, and so the outside options will not be determined by the match productivity.
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transition probability: πsr ≥ 0. Let ht := (s1,s2,...,st) be the history at t. Workers and
ﬁrms discount the future with common discount factor β∈(0,1).
Atthestartofdate1,aftertheinitialstate s1 isobserved,5 theﬁrmofferstheworkera
contract(wt(ht))T
t=1 =((w1(s1),w2(s1,s2),w3(s1,s2,s3),...)), where wt (ht)≥0isthewage
at t after history ht, and T >1 is the (random) date at which the contract is terminated.6
The within period timing is as follows. At the start of each period, both agents observe
the current state of nature, st. At this point either party can quit and take their outside
option. Otherwise, they trade at the agreed terms, in which case the value of output z(st)
is realized, and the ﬁrm then makes a wage payment according to the contract. (Thus
we do not allow, for example, for the ﬁrm to renege on its wage payment after the worker
has contributed to output.) The value (discounted utility) of the outside option for the
worker and ﬁrm respectively is denoted by χw(s) and χf (s) in state s.7
Let Vt (ht) denote the continuation utility from t onwards from the contract (as-








where E denotes expectation. Likewise the ﬁrm’s continuation proﬁt is







The contract is said to be self-enforcing if the following hold for all dates t, T −1≥ t ≥1,
and for all positive probability ht (with initial state s1):
Vt (ht)≥χw (st)−Cw, (3)
Πt (ht)≥χf (st)−Cf , (4)
5If matches also start at later dates, the characterization developed below, which depends only on the
state prevailing at the time the contract starts, is the same.
6So that at t =T, after observing the current state st, the partnership dissolves and both agents get their
outside options. T is a random variable (a stopping time) so that the length of the contract will in general
depend on the history of shocks. At this level of generality, termination must be allowed for as there may be
no continuation values that satisfy participation constraints.
7In much of the existing literature it is assumed that competition among ﬁrms drives proﬁts to zero from
new matches so χf = 0. Even with competition, if other inputs such as capital were included in the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts, then the participation constraint for the ﬁrm would require that it covers capital costs. This would
make the ﬁrm’s outside option state dependent if say, the interest rate varied with the state. See Calmès
(2007) for a model including a ﬁxed capital component where the outside options of competitive ﬁrms are
state dependent. Further, although in a more general model outside options may not be a function of the
current state only, in most models where the outside option is endogenous, as considered in Section 3, the
payoff from a new contract, and hence the outside option, will only depend on the current state.
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whereCf andCw arerespectivedirectlyincurredquitting/mobilitycostsfortheﬁrmand
worker.8 Inequality (3) is the worker’s participation constraint that says that at any point
in the future the contract must offer at least what a worker can get by quitting, net of
quitting costs, while (4) is the corresponding constraint for the ﬁrm.9 We assume that
χw(s)−Cw > u(0)/(1−β) so that if a feasible contract exists it will pay positive wages at
some point.
Weshallbeinterestedinconstrainedefﬁcientcontracts,thatistosaycontractswhich
are self-enforcing and are not Pareto-dominated by any other self-enforcing contracts.






subject to (3), (4), and
(5) V1(h1)≥ ¯ V1.
The term ¯ V1 measures how much utility the worker gets from the relationship, and as
this is varied across feasible values (i.e. values for which self-enforcing contract exist), all
efﬁcient contracts are traced out.10
LEMMA 1: In an efﬁcient contract in which the ﬁrm’s (worker’s) participation con-
straint is slack at t +1, wages cannot fall (rise) between t and t +1.
PROOF: Supposeweareatht, andsupposethattheﬁrms’sparticipationconstraint
at t +1 in some state s is not binding. By assumption the contract is not terminated at
t +1 (otherwise the constraint would trivially bind). Consider, starting from the optimal
contract, reshufﬂing wages between t, and t +1 in state s, to backload them (assume
wt >0). Increase the wage at t +1 after state s by a small amount ∆, and cut the wage at
t by x so as to leave the worker indifferent; do not change the contract otherwise:
πstsβu0(wt+1(ht,s))∆−u0(wt(ht))x '0.
This backloading satisﬁes all worker participation constraints since the worker’s utility
rises at t +1, and so even if her constraint were binding, it will not be violated; at t her
8Either party can initiate termination, but both suffer the costs. We assume that these are also incurred if
the contract is terminated by agreement (i.e. at t =T), so they are costs which cannot be avoided on match
break-up. It would also be equivalent in these circumstances to factor these costs directly into outside
options. See Section 2.4 for discussion of alternative assumptions.
9It is also possible to introduce hiring costs for the ﬁrm. The contract dynamics do not depend on
whether there are hiring costs (unlike quitting costs which may potentially affect the contract dynamics,
see Section 2.4 below), but apply as soon as a relationship is established. Thus if the ﬁrm incurs hiring costs
to establish a relationship, to judge the proﬁtability of the relationship it would have to subtract them from
whatever surplus it makes once the relationship is established in the manner to be described.
10The issue of existence of solutions to this problem for feasible ¯ V1 is standard in this environment.
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constraint holds as her utility is unchanged, and likewise it is unchanged earlier since










If (6) holds (so that wages are falling), then the backloading would raise proﬁts at t, so
the ﬁrm’s participation constraint would hold at t, and at t +1 by assumption the ﬁrm’s
participation constraint is slack, so a small change to the wage will not violate it. Thus
all constraints are satisﬁed by this change, and proﬁts have increased, contrary to the
optimality of the original contract. So (6) cannot hold: marginal utility growth cannot
be positive, or equivalently, wages cannot fall. By a symmetric argument if the worker’s
participation constraint is slack at t +1, then wages cannot rise between t and t +1. 2
The proof of this lemma is illustrated in Figure 1. In the ﬁgure wages at date t,
wt are plotted against wages at date t +1, wt+1 in some state s. Plotted in the ﬁgure
are a worker’s indifference curve and two of the ﬁrm’s iso-proﬁt lines (the dashed lines).
Utility increases toward the North-East of the diagram and proﬁts increase toward the
South-West. The slope of the indifference curve where it crosses the 45° line is βπst,s,
the discounted probability of reaching the state s at date t +1 from state st at date t,
and this is just equal to the slope of the ﬁrm’s iso-proﬁt lines. Consider ﬁrst a contract
where wages are at a point like A in Figure 1. As point A is above the 45° line the wage
is falling, wt > wt+1. If the ﬁrm’s participation constraint does not bind at date t +1
then it would be possible to adjust wages along the indifference curve in the direction
of equalizing wages and move to a higher iso-proﬁt line. As wt+1 is increased this will
relax the worker’s participation constraint at date t +1 in state s and for a small change
in wages it will not violate the ﬁrm’s participation constraint at date t +1 as this was
assumed to be slack. Thus at any point like A an improvement in the contract can be
found and hence we can conclude that wages cannot be falling if the ﬁrm’s constraint
is slack. It is however, clear that a similar argument cannot necessarily be applied at a
point like B, below the 45° line, where wages are rising. Although a movement along the
indifference curve toward equality of wages will raise proﬁts, reducing wt+1 may violate
the worker’s participation constraint at date t +1. Thus we have the intuitive result that
wages will rise only if the worker’s participation constraint is binding and fall only if the
ﬁrm’s participation constraint is binding.
Next, we need to characterize more precisely what happens to the wage when one




t=1 be a constrained efﬁcient
contract in Problem A starting from state s1 = s. This must deliver precisely ¯ V1 to the






Figure 1: ILLUSTRATION OF LEMMA 1
worker,otherwisewecancuttheperiod1wagewithoutviolatingtheworker’sconstraint,
thus increasing proﬁts.11 We deﬁne
¯
ws := w1(χw(s)−Cw;s), i.e. the period 1 wage spec-
iﬁed by an optimal contract starting in state s which delivers exactly the worker’s net
outside option, ¯ V1 =χw(s)−Cw. It must be unique by a simple convexity argument (see
below). A key observation is the following: it must be optimal at any date t in state s
to set wt =
¯
ws whenever Vt (ht) = χw(s)−Cw. This follows from the fact that the future
distributionoverstatesdependsonlyon s,andthatthecontinuationcontractmustitself
be optimal (otherwise replacing the continuation contract by a lower cost one which de-
livered the same continuation utility would reduce the initial costs but satisfy all partici-
pation constraints). Thus,
¯
ws is the wage in state s at any t if the participation constraint
is binding. Similarly deﬁne ¯ ws to be the period 1 wage speciﬁed by an optimal contract
starting in state s which delivers proﬁts of exactly χf (s)−Cf .
It can then be established that if an optimal contract offers a continuation higher
utility, then it must offer a higher ﬁrst period wage:
LEMMA 2: If V 0 >V , then w1(V 0;s)> w1(V ;s).
11Provided w1 >0; otherwise, sinceitisassumedthattheoutsideoptiondominateszeroconsumptionfor
ever, it is easily shown that there must be a point in the future at which wt >0 and the worker’s constraint is
not binding, so wages can be cut at this point instead.
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PROOF: Assume otherwise, so that w1(V 0;s) ≤ w1(V ;s). Suppose at some point
in the future on some path ht that wt(V 0;st) > wt(V ;st) for the ﬁrst time, and the dis-
counted utility from t is higher in the V 0 contract. This ht must exist as the V 0 contract
offershigherutility. Thisimpliesthatwagegrowthbetween t−1and t isgreaterintheV 0
case, which from Lemma 1 can only be true if one or both of the following occur: (i) the
worker’s participation constraint binds at t for the V 0 contract; (ii) the ﬁrm’s constraint
binds in the V contract. In case (i) in the V 0 contract, wages are weakly lower than in
theV contract until minimum continuation utility is obtained (so theV contract cannot
offer less from this point); thus discounted utility cannot be greater in the V 0 contract,
contrary to assumption. In case (ii) in the V 0 contract, wages are weakly lower than in
the V contract until maximum continuation utility is obtained in the V contract, again
contrary to assumption. 2
PROPOSITION 1: An optimal contract evolves according to the following updating
rule. In state s ∈ S either (a) the contract (always) terminates, or (b) there is associated
a minimum and a maximum wage,
¯
ws and ¯ ws respectively (
¯
ws ≤ ¯ ws), such that in an





¯ wst+1 if wt > ¯ wst+1,







wst+1 if wt <
¯
wst+1.
PROOF: If there exist self-enforcing continuation utilities from s (i.e. if a self-
enforcing contract exists) then by deﬁnition an efﬁcient contract should continue as
each player gets at least their outside option, and cannot be worse off. Otherwise ter-
mination must occur. Thus we assume w.l.o.g. that termination does not occur at s for
the remainder of the proof. We start by showing that
¯
ws is unique. Suppose otherwise:
then there are two distinct contracts that deliver χw(s)−Cw to a worker, both of which
satisfy participation constraints and yield the same costs. Take a strict convex combi-
nation of these two contracts (i.e., a convex combination of wages at each ht). From (1)
and the concavity of u(·) it is clear this increases a worker’s utility, and satisﬁes the par-
ticipation constraint at each point. Costs are linear in wages, and hence are unchanged.
Thus a small reduction in the initial wage (in state s) will still satisfy participation, and
will lead to lower costs, a contradiction. So
¯
ws is unique. Likewise ¯ ws is unique. More-
over, by Lemma 2,
¯
ws ≤ ¯ ws since a contract that delivers the ﬁrm χf (s)−Cf (i.e., corre-
sponding to ¯ ws) must deliver the worker at least χw(s)−Cw (i.e. corresponding to
¯
ws),
otherwise the worker’s participation constraint would be violated. Next, suppose that
¯





. If the worker’s participation constraint at t +1 in





is slack (wt+1 6= ¯ wst+1), so this contradicts Lemma 1 which asserts that wages do not fall.
Thus the worker’s constraint does not hold, and we know from Lemma 1 that wages can-
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not rise. Likewise as wt < ¯ wst+1 the worker’s constraint cannot bind, and wages cannot





, wages remain constant. Next suppose that wt ≤
¯
wst+1.
Then if the worker’s constraint does not hold (Vt+1 >χw(st+1)−Cw), by Lemma 1 wages
cannot rise, so wt+1 ≤
¯
wst+1. However, Vt+1 > χw(st+1)−Cw would imply by Lemma 2
(comparing with the contract that delivers χw(st+1)−Cw) that wt+1 >
¯
wst+1, a contradic-
tion. So the constraint binds and wt+1 =
¯
wst+1. A symmetrical argument establishes that
wt+1 = ¯ wst+1 if wt > ¯ wst+1. 2
Thus wages evolve in a simple fashion: they remain constant unless this takes the





for the current state, in which case
the wage changes by the minimum amount needed to bring it into this interval. This is
a very intuitive resolution of the desire of the worker to smooth earnings and the need
to self-enforce the contract. It is important to remember however, that the endpoints of
the intervals are determined optimally and do not simply reﬂect feasibility. For example,
it may be feasible to pay a wage lower than
¯
ws and meet the worker’s participation con-
straint by offering increased wages further in the future. It will not however, be optimal
to do so as this would introduce further undesirable variability in future wages. It should





are history independent, the op-
timal wage contract will not be independent of history. However, once an endpoint of
an interval is hit, say at date t, then the only relevant part of the history ht is the state
at date t, st, and previous history ht−1 becomes irrelevant. The only thing remaining to
be determined is the initial wage, w1(s1). This will be determined by ¯ V1 in Problem A,
and this can in turn be thought of as depending on the bargaining strengths of the two
parties or the initial outside options of the two parties. By varying the initial wage all
possible splits of the joint surplus will be traced out.12





will in general depend on all the pa-
rameters of the model including the worker’s preferences and the stochastic process for
productivity. However, the outside options and the quitting and mobility costs Cw and
Cf , will also play a crucial role in the determination of these interval endpoints. We will
provide the more speciﬁc assumptions in various models as we encounter them. In the
ﬁrst paper to analyze a problem of this type, Thomas & Worrall (1988), it is assumed that
Cw andCf are zero, and if a worker reneges, thereafter she can ﬁnd work only at the spot
market wage, where because of competition among ﬁrms, the wage equals current pro-
ductivity z(st) (which is assumed to be a common shock across all ﬁrms). Similarly, if
a ﬁrm reneges it is assumed it can hire at the spot market rate. This may be motivated
as follows. Suppose there are, in addition to inﬁnitely-lived workers and ﬁrms, at each
date m workers and n ﬁrms, n > m, who live for only one period. Since there is no en-
forcement mechanism and no mobility costs, the one-period-lived agents trade at the
spot market wage. The inﬁnitely-lived agents are competitive and thus treat these spot
12For an intuitive derivation of a version of this proposition, including a discussion of when termination
occurs, see Malcomson (1999).
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market wages as given. This is then in line with reputation models of repeated games,
and corresponds to the most severe credible punishment. It requires that when an agent
reneges she is observed by everyone else, and once she has reneged she has proved her-
self unreliable and no one will sign a contract with her again. Likewise for a ﬁrm which
has reneged in the past. The implication is that a worker who reneges will receive a con-
sumption stream equal to productivity at each date, and so χw(s) equals the discounted
expected utility generated by this stream.
The most direct testing of the implications of this two-sided model is by Macis
(2006),usinglongitudinal,matchedemployer-employeedataonalargesampleofItalian
workers employed at ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector.13 He tests a number of impli-
cations of the model. A ﬁrst implication, which follows from Lemma 2 that the wage
¯
ws will be increasing in the outside option of the working. Assuming that these outside
opportunities can be proxied by the unemployment rate and with some additional re-
strictions on the model,14 the updating rule implies that controlling for current outside
opportunities and other worker characteristics, the current wage will respond negatively
to the initial unemployment rate (when the contract was entered into), and the best and
worst unemployment rates since the contract started.15 Macis ﬁnds that all three un-
employment rates (initial, best and worst matter, providing some support for the model
and suggesting that both the worker’s and the ﬁrm’s outside option constraints matter. It
shouldhoweverbenotedthatGrant(2003)alsousedthehighestunemploymentrateina
similar analysis of U.S. data, and found less evidence for its signiﬁcance, while Devereux
& Hart (2007) ﬁnd it to be either insigniﬁcant or largely incorrectly signed in U.K. data.16
A second implication of the model is that “cohort effects”—differences between
wages for different entry cohorts within a ﬁrm—will tend not to persist. The wage inter-
vals will be cohort independent, so that a large change in outside opportunities should
eliminateanydifferencesifallcohortsneedto“renegotiate”(havebindingself-enforcing
constraints). Consistent with this, Macis ﬁnds that the correlation between the unem-
ployment rate prevailing at the time of hiring and current wages declines with tenure. A
further test is based on the following observation: if a worker’s wage rose between t −1
andt,thenaccordingtothemodelsheisconstrainedatt. Thisimpliesanasymmetric re-
13It should be noted that it is difﬁcult to distinguish the limited commitment hypothesis from that of
efﬁcient incomplete contracts to overcome hold-up when there are exogenous switching costs (MacLeod
& Malcomson (1993); see also Malcomson (1997)). The latter can also however rationalise rigid nominal
contracts, something that the risk-sharing approach cannot.
14See Macis (2006) for details.
15This extends the testing approach of Beaudry & DiNardo (1991) in the one-sided commitment case,
whichisdiscussedinSection3.2below,whereonlythelowestunemploymentratesincethecontractstarted
should be relevant.
16Grant (2003) ﬁnds maximum unemployment to matter in a basic individual ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation,
but not if year and tenure dummies are included (whereas the effect of minimum unemployment is largely
robust to these additions; see Section 3.2).
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sponse to changes in outside options. Suppose ﬁrst that unemployment rises in the next
period between t and t+1 so that the worker’s outside option worsens. This should relax
the constraint, and certainly a small change should not imply that the ﬁrm’s constraint
binds, so the wage will be unchanged; a larger rise in unemployment will however cause
the ﬁrm’s constraint to bind and the wage to fall. On the other hand, if unemployment
falls, the improvement in the worker’s outside option will further tighten the constraint,
pushing up the wage, even if this change is small. This is what Macis ﬁnds in the data.
However the prediction should also work in the opposite direction when wages fall be-
tween t −1 and t, so that the ﬁrm’s constraint can be assumed to be binding, but in this
case small increases in unemployment at t +1 (which should further tighten the ﬁrm’s
constraint) do not appear to reduce wages.
Two further implications are also considered by Macis. First an implication of our
assumptions is that market conditions before the start of the contract have no effect on
the contracted wage. This is what Macis ﬁnds in the data and this provides some evi-
dence against models where contracts to new workers must match those already given
to incumbents. Secondly he considers worker heterogeneity in terms of their mobility
costs. He ﬁnds evidence that high wage earners have contracts that are more responsive
to market conditions than low wage earners. This would be consistent with the model if
it is assumed that high wage earners have lower mobility costs and hence grater outside
opportunities.
2.2. Introducing variable hours
The baseline model presented above is important in understanding the behavior
of wages as the insurance motive partially disassociates wages from productivity. It is
commonly observed in many countries that labor market ﬂuctuations are characterized
by large procyclical variations in hours, but far smaller variations in wages. It has been
suggested that the insurance provided in wage contracts can help explain this (Rosen
(1985), Azariadis(1975)). Abowd&Card(1987)andBoldrin&Horvath(1995)havetested
theimplicitcontractmodeloffullinsuranceagainstthespotmarketalternativeandhave
found some weak support for the contracting hypothesis over the alternative.
In order to address the behavior of both wages and hours in the limited commit-
ment model this subsection shows how the baseline model presented above can be ex-
tended to allow for joint determination of wages and hours within the contract.17 In this
case a contract will specify not only a proﬁle for wages (wt(ht))T
t=1 but also a proﬁle for
hours worked (Ht(ht))T
t=1. It is assumed that the worker has per-period twice differen-
tiablestrictlyconcaveutilityfunctionu(c,H)whereworkisdisliked,souH <0. Itwillfur-
ther be assumed that leisure is a normal good so that the Engel curve for hours worked is
downward sloping. As before it is assumed that workers cannot engage in capital market
17See also Malcomson (1999).
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transactions so that consumption is equal to earnings, c(ht) = w(ht)H(ht). The contin-
uation utilities are deﬁned analogously to equations (1) and (2) but with the per-period
payoffsoftheworkerandtheﬁrmarereplacedbyu(ct(ht),H(ht))and z(st)H(ht)−ct(ht)
respectively. The self-enforcing constraints are then still given by equations (3) and (4)






subject to (3), (4), and (5). Again if matches start at a later date the characterization is
exactly the same as it depends only on the state in which the match is initiated.
The ﬁrst thing to note about the solution to Problem A0 is that hours will be chosen





To see this consider a pure intratemporal reallocation of consumption and hours that
leaves proﬁts unchanged. That is consider a change in consumption of ∆c and a change
in hours ∆H such that ∆c = z∆H. The net effect on utility is approximately uc(c,H)∆c +
uH(c,H)∆H = (uc(c,H)z +uH(c,H))∆H. Thus if −uH/uc < z a small decrease in hours,
∆H <0 would raise utility and if −uH/uc > z a small increase in hours would raise utility.
Henceattheoptimum(7)musthold. Thereasonwhythisconditionholdsisthattheself-
enforcing constraints are concerned only with the intertemporal allocation and thus do
not interfere with the efﬁcient intratemporal allocation of hours.19
It is further possible to ﬁnd the updating rule analogous to Proposition 1. To do this
we deﬁne the marginal utility of consumption
(8) λt(ht)=uc(ct(ht),Ht(ht)).











¯ λst+1 if λt > ¯ λst+1,







λst+1 if λt <
¯
λst+1.
Here ¯ λst+1 is the value of λ which delivers the exactly the worker’s outside option and
¯
λst+1 is the value that delivers the ﬁrm’s outside option. The initial value of λ will be de-
18This was ﬁrst pointed out in Beaudry & DiNardo (1995).
19If there were also a moral hazard or adverse selection problem then (7) would not hold and in general
there would be an interaction between the intratemporal and intertemporal allocation problems.
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termined by the bargaining strength or initial outside options of the parties as reﬂected




λst+1 =u0( ¯ wst+1).
To consider the contractual solution for the path of wages and hours, ﬁrst consider
the following two equations
uc(c,H)=λ (10)
−uH(c,H)=λz. (11)
The solutions to the two equations (10) and (11) are the Frisch-type demand functions
c(λ,z) and H(λ,z).21 It is easy to check that provided leisure is a normal good, the hours
function H(λ,z) is increasing in λ and z. The intuition is that a decrease in λ holding
z ﬁxed, and hence holding the marginal rate of substitution constant, is a pure posi-
tive income effect and therefore, because leisure is normal, leads to a decrease in hours
worked. Equally, an increase in productivity holding the marginal utility of consump-
tion, λ, ﬁxed leads to a substitution effect and therefore an increase in hours worked.
It can also be checked that the function c(λ,z) is decreasing in λ provided consump-
tion is normal.22 In the limited commitment contractual solution, consumption and
hours satisfy equations (10) and (11) where at each history consumption equals earn-
ings, ct(ht) = wt(ht)Ht(ht), and λt(ht) satisﬁes equation (8) and follows the updating
rule given by equation (9). It follows from the equation of earnings and consumption,
that provided consumption is normal, the contractual wage rate w(λ,z) is decreasing in
λ and z.23
The implications of the model have been considered and tested by Beaudry & Di-
Nardo (1995). Consider ﬁrst the case of complete insurance so that λ is ﬁxed and deter-
mined by the initial bargaining position at the time the contract is begun. This may vary
from worker to worker. Thus workers who enter the contract with a better bargaining
position (lower λ) will in any given state (and hence productivity z) have higher wage
rates and lower hours. Looking at a cross section of workers therefore it is to be expected
20Here λ is the inverse of the multiplier on inequality (5) in Problem A0. Thus a lower value of λ corre-
sponds to a greater bargaining strength for the worker. See Sigouin (2004) for a derivation of the updating
rule in the case of separable preferences.
21These are Frisch-type as Frisch demand functions are derived by keeping the marginal utility of wealth
constant and where the marginal rate of substitution equals the real wage (see below).
22Theeffectofanincreaseinz onconsumptionisambiguousanddependsonwhetherthemarginalutility
of consumption increases or decreases with hours worked (i.e. on the sign of ucH): if utility is separable,
consumption is independent of z for a ﬁxed λ.
23This is easy to see if utility is separable in consumption and hours worked: with z ﬁxed an increase
in λ increases the marginal disutility of labor from equation (11) and hence the hours worked. Equally an
increase in λ increases the marginal utility of consumption so that consumption or earnings is decreased.
Since hours are increased it follows that the wage rate falls. A separable formulation for preferences is used
by Sigouin (2004) in his search model (see Section 3.1 below).
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that hours are negatively related to wage rates. This is to be contrasted with the standard
intertemporal model of labor supply. In that model equations (10) and (11) apply with
z = w andwithλdeterminedbyanEulerequationoftheformλt =(1+rt)βE[λt+1]where
rt is the interest rate on borrowing and lending. Since the standard intertemporal model
oflaborsupplyallowstheworkertoself-insurethroughborrowingandlending,earnings
need not equal consumption and therefore it follows directly from equation (11) with z
replacedbythewagerate w thattheFrischlaborsupplyfunction H(λ,w)isincreasingin
w holding λ ﬁxed provided only that the marginal disutility of work is increasing. This is
the intertemporal substitution effect that as wages rise more hours of work are supplied
so that wages and hours should be positively associated holding the marginal utility of
wealth ﬁxed. Of course λ will not in general be constant over time and therefore the
long-run elasticity of wages on hours will depend on the evolution of λ.
Beaudry & DiNardo (1995) also consider the implications of the case where the par-
ticipation constraints are binding in some states. Depending on the history of states
any individual worker may have any λt(ht) ∈ [
¯
λst, ¯ λst] for a given state and productivity
z(st). This has three important effects. First although different workers initially em-
ployed at different dates may have different λs, as soon as both workers are constrained
in a particular state (or the ﬁrm is constrained for both workers), their λs will be equal-
ized and therefore they will have the same wages and hours in subsequent periods. Thus
the cross-sectional variation in wages and hours across employees should be lower with
increasing tenure. Second, for any worker who is constrained following an increase in
productivity, there will be a decrease in λ and two offsetting effects: the hours worked
will increase because of the increase in productivity but the decrease in λ will offset this
and tend to reduce hours worked. Similarly the wage rate will rise because of the de-
crease in λ but fall because of the increase in productivity. Thus the model will predict
anambiguousorweakeffectofchangesinproductivityonhoursandwagerates. Thirdly,
for workers with different starting points the change in λ experienced by different work-
ers will be different. Therefore the consequent growth rates in wages and hours will vary
across workers of different tenure.
In testing the relationship between hours and wages Beaudry & DiNardo (1995) use
an instrumental variable approach. They use the implications of the limited commit-
ment solution and exploit both variations due to time of entry into a job and cross-
sectional variation in on the job wage growth associated with different cohorts (iden-
tiﬁed by time of entry into a job). Thus they use time of entry dummy variables and year
of entry cross-year dummies to instrument for wage growth. Using the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) 1976–1989 for male heads of household Beaudry & DiNardo
(1995) estimate the relationship between hours and wages according to the equation
∆lnHj,τ+t =α1∆lnwj,τ+t +α2∆lnzj,k,τ+t +α3∆Xj,τ+t +²j,τ+t.
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Hours, Hj,τ+t measure annual hours at date τ+t of worker j hired in year τ, Xj,τ+t mea-
sures marital and union status and ²j,τ+t is the error term. The wage rates, wj,τ+t are
measured in two alternative ways, either as an annual average or as the reported “point
in time” estimate from the survey information. The productivity term zj,k,τ+t is decom-
posed into industry speciﬁc terms (k denotes the industry), and a quadratic experience
and tenure proﬁle for each worker. The equation is estimated in log differences to ac-
count for worker speciﬁc productivity differences at the time of hiring.
They ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship between hours and wages.
The test of the validity of their instrumental variable approach shows that typically the
instruments for productivity are not only affecting hours through their effect on wages.
However when Beaudry & DiNardo restrict data either to non-union contracts or by ex-
cluding workers that have recently switched jobs they ﬁnd that for these subsets the
over-identiﬁcation restrictions are rejected less frequently while the coefﬁcient α1 re-
mains signiﬁcantly negative. This offers strong evidence in support of what the limited
commitment contracting model would predict. It is however, important to recall that as
mentioned above this model is not testing against an alternative. Thus unless assump-
tions are made about the long-run intertemporal elasticity of substitution this cannot be
taken as evidence against the spot market model. When the estimates for α1 are com-
bined with the results of Beaudry & DiNardo (1991) (discussed below in Section 3.2) this
suggests that a 1% reduction in unemployment would lead to a 3–4% increase in the
wage rate and therefore a reduction in hours worked of between one-half and one per-
cent absent changes in productivity. This combination would seem to give quite plausi-
ble estimates for the change in hours.
2.3. Up-front wage payments
In the absence of any participation constraints on the ﬁrm or worker it is without
loss of generality to assume that wage payments are made ex post once the state is real-
ized. However, Gauthier, Poitevin & Gonzáez (1997) have pointed out that in the pres-
ence of participation constraints, ex ante or up-front payments might be used to help
relax the participation constraints and achieve greater risk sharing. For example, sup-
pose that the worker is getting relatively low expected discounted utility from the con-
tract (relative to the outside option values), then she will be tempted to renege in some




ther self-enforcing constraint as the ﬁrm might be tempted to simply take the up-front
payment and renege when called upon to make the reverse payment.
To analyze this case in more detail it is necessary to be more speciﬁc on how the
up-front payments affect the outside options of the ﬁrm and the worker. To do this sup-
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pose that we return to the case where hours are ﬁxed and assume for simplicity that the
costs Cf and Cw are zero. Furthermore assume that the outside options χf and χw are
determined by the value of trading on the spot market as explained above. Let y denote
the value of the up-front payment made from the worker to the ﬁrm. We assume that
this could be negative in which case the up-front payment is made by the ﬁrm. The con-
tract will then specify at up-front payment contingent on the history up to that date in
addition to the wage payment. The continuation utilities are as deﬁned in equations (1)
and (2) but with w(ht)− y(ht−1) replacing w(ht). Let V a
s denote the worker’s expected
















Then because the expected payoff to the ﬁrm from trading on the spot market is zero,






s +[u(zs −y(ht−1))−u(zs)], (30)
Πt (ht−1,s)≥ y(ht−1). (40)
Allowing for up-front payments, however, introduces additional ex ante participation




at every date and history. It can be seen that if say, y(ht−1) > 0 so that the worker makes
an up-front payment, then the ﬁrm’s ex post participation constraints become more
stringent whereas the worker’s ex post participation constraints are relaxed.
There are some implications of the up-front payment for the contractual solution.
Lemmas 1 and 2 continue to apply but where the wage payment is considered as the
total wage payment w(ht−1,s)− y(ht−1). Proposition 1, however, requires some modi-
ﬁcation. It can be seen that the worker will make an up-front payment when she gets
relatively little ex ante gain from the contract in order to relax the ex post participation
constraints. Conversely the ﬁrm will make an up-front payment when it gets relatively
little gain from the contract. Since the updating rule of Proposition 1 is determined by
the ex post participation constraints this means that the new updating rule will depend
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on past history through the up-front payment. For example suppose the worker makes
an up-front payment but that the state moves to one very favorable to the worker. Then
in the next period the worker might have be in a strong position in the contract and the
ﬁrm may be making an up-front payment next period. Thus in general the consumption
levels at which the ex post constraints are binding will depend on the up-front payments
making the updating rule itself history dependent. It is difﬁcult to characterize the solu-
tion further without imposing more structure on the model.24
An extreme case, where the ﬁrm can fully commit, so that it faces no participation
constraints (a case we analyze in Section 3.2 below), does lead to a stark conclusion. In
this case the worker can make an up-front payment sufﬁcient to relax the ex post par-
ticipation constraints. Effectively the worker gives a bond to the ﬁrm which she would
forfeit if she were to renege. This will improve risk sharing and can allow full efﬁciency
to be achieved. The use of up-front payments of this type is not frequently observed in
practice and may be subject to legal restriction and therefore we shall ignore up-front
payments in what follows.25
2.4. More on quitting costs
Much of the literature assumes that quitting costs are zero (e.g., Thomas & Worrall
(1988), Beaudry & DiNardo (1991)) although the search models described below in Sec-
tion 3.1 implicitly assume there is a cost to quitting as new matches cannot be made
immediately. The basic theory considered in Section 2.1 allows for termination costs
(Cf ,Cw) which are assumed to be incurred by both parties whenever either party termi-
natestherelationshipandgoesforitsoutsideoption. Withthisassumptionthetermina-
tion costs can be simply incorporated into the outside options or whenever termination
is mutually agreed. If, however, there is a direct cost to reneging on an agreement over
and above necessary economic costs, for example, because of psychic, legal or reputa-
tion costs, then such costs cannot be simply factored into the outside options and it is
necessary to slightly modify the previous characterization.26 In particular, the termina-
tion rule is less straightforward. Suppose the direct costs to reneging are pi, i = w, f
(these could be made state-dependent) and ignore the costs Cf ,Cw considered earlier
24The discussion of ex ante payments has been generalized by Dubois, Jullien & Magnac (2007) who allow
for formal payments contingent on a set of events which is a subset of the set of states. In the case where
only one event can be identiﬁed, the formal contract is equivalent to the single ex ante payment of Gauthier
et al. (1997).
25If savings are introduced into the model than savings can fulﬁll a similar role and obviate the need for
up-front payments (except at the initial date). For a model where this is true in a limited commitment
environment see Ligon, Thomas & Worrall (2000).
26A similar argument would apply if there were some enforced compensation on contract breach, as it is
only the cost to the reneger that matters. If however there are enforced costs on break-up, such as redun-
dancy payments (i.e., that are incurred even if it is agreed to terminate the relationship), then these should
be factored into the outside options.
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(or factor them into the outside options χi(st)). The self-enforcing constraints become
Vt (ht)≥χw (st)−pw,
Πt (ht)≥χf (st)−pf .
Suppose that after observing the current state at t, the Pareto-frontier conditional on
the relationship continuing is calculated. That is, consider self-enforcing agreements
from state st which do not terminate immediately and calculate the frontier from their
payoffs. If it is the case that (χw(st),χf (st)) lies inside this frontier then termination is
inefﬁcient and cannot occur in any efﬁcient agreement, since by deﬁnition there is a
non-terminating self-enforcing contract which could be followed instead of termination
and which would be better for both parties. If however (χw(st),χf (st)) lies above the
frontier, then termination may or may not be efﬁcient depending on the past history
of states. This case is illustrated in Figure 2 which depicts the frontier conditional on
continuation and the outside options point χ(st) = (χw(st),χf (st)) for some particular
state st. In this case, the overall frontier for this state is composed of the non-dominated
points from the set of the frontier conditional on non-termination plus (χw(st),χf (st)).
As can be seen from Figure 2 there can be no agreement that corresponds to a division
of the payoffs on the dotted part of the no-termination frontier as this would be domi-
nated by termination. In particular, if there were such an agreement on the dotted part
of the no-termination frontier then the parties would agree to termination. This would
lead to to an improvement for both ﬁrm and worker and would be better that either
party quitting as it would avoid the quitting or reneging costs. On the other hand if the
updating rule were to put the division of the payoffs along the solid section of the no-
termination frontier, then although termination will be better for one party, it will not
be a Pareto-improvement. Hence termination will not be agreed and the agreement will
be supported by the quitting or reneging costs which will prevent parties from unilater-
ally defaulting. Thus the implication of allowing for quitting or reneging costs is that the
optimality of termination may now depend on the previous history, and so we lose the
simple termination rule of Proposition 1.27
Another issue arises if the ﬁrm employs many workers and that rather than deal-
ing with each employee bilaterally, as we have assumed so far, an employer is required
to treat every employee in the same way. Furthermore, suppose that this restriction ap-
plies even to subsequent hires, so that they must be paid the same as incumbents from
the point they join. That is a worker hired after history hτ must be offered the contin-
uation of the original contract: (wτ(hτ),wτ+1(hτ,sτ+1),wτ+2(hτ,sτ+1,sτ+2),...). Provided
27Thisdiscussionassumesthatside-paymentsarenotpossible. However,ifside-paymentswerefeasibleit
may be that after observing st the contract speciﬁes termination plus a payment from one agent to another,
and the penalties pi may support this to an extent (for example, the ﬁrm will be prepared to transfer up to
pf ). In this case instead of a single point (χw,χf ) being added to set of payoffs, a curve through (χw,χf )
determined by the trade-off of the side payments between the two agents will be added.
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Figure 2: TERMINATION AND QUITTING COSTS
the ﬁrm needs to hire new workers each period, it must therefore ensure the continu-
ation of the contract matches new hires’ outside options. This induces a participation
constraint even if quitting costs are substantial so that the contract will approximate one
under full commitment. Then the participation constraint is just as before except that
χw(s) is now the alternative option for new hires. The analysis of this case and empirical
implications have been discussed in Martins et al. (2005). Although the worker partici-
pation constraint has the same form as the one considered earlier, because it applies to
differentcohortsatthesametime,thewagedynamicsandmacroeconomicimplications
are different. Essentially the ﬁrm, by attempting to insure incumbents, offers a contract
that may not as ﬂexible as would be needed to clear the market for current job seekers.
See Snell & Thomas (2006) for an analysis of this case.
3. ENDOGENIZING THE WORKERS’ OUTSIDE OPTION
As explained above in Thomas & Worrall (1988) the worker’s outside option χw(s) is
determined by the expected discounted utility a worker would get from being employed
henceforth at the spot market wage. Thus the outside option will depend only on the
exogenous productivity process. In order to justify this assumption it is necessary to as-
sume that all ﬁrms can perfectly observe the worker’s past history and observe when a
worker reneges on a contract, and punish the worker by not offering her anything other
than a spot contract. An alternative assumption is that ﬁrms treat all new workers in
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the same way, irrespective of whether or not they have reneged on a previous contract.
According to this view, when a worker quits a ﬁrm, she can look for a new job offering
as much insurance as in the contract from which she just quit. If however, workers and
ﬁrms could move costlessly to other contracts then no non-spot contracts could be sus-
tained.28 Therefore it will be necessary to assume either that there are other frictions
such as search costs in the labor market, or that ﬁrms can commit to contracts. We deal
with each of these in turn.
3.1. Search frictions
In this section we discuss two papers (Sigouin (2004), Rudanko (2006)) which em-
bed the above model into a matching framework to analyze the association of certain
variables with aggregate productivity. Both argue that the two-sided limited commit-
ment model performs better than full commitment models and other versions such as
spotcontracts,one-sidedlimitedcommitmentorcontinuousbargaining. Sigouin(2004)
allows hours, but not employment, to vary, while Rudanko (2006) allows employment
and vacancies to vary. However in both of these matching models there is also the pos-
sibility of an unemployment spell before a new contract is found, so the outside option
χw(s) is less than the utility from a new contract.
Sigouin (2004) develops the model with variable hours by allowing the outside op-
tion χw(s) to be determined by contracts offered by other ﬁrms, rather than on a spot
market as in the Thomas-Worrall model. He assumes however, that if a worker quits
fromoneﬁrmshefacesaprobabilityofnotbeingmatchedwithanewﬁrm(eventhough
if matching does occur, it happens without a delay) and being unemployed.29 This is
sufﬁcient to drive a potential wedge between what a worker can get by remaining in
the contract and what is available by quitting, and allows for some insurance to be sus-
tained. Then χw(s) is determined by what a worker would get by quitting and waiting for
a job; because of competition between ﬁrms a new job yields the worker the maximum
surplus from a self-enforcing contract; however the worker may be unlucky and suffer
unemployment, so this is also factored into χw(s).
28Thisassertionassumesthatthesurplussplitinstates fromanewcontractisalwaysthesame. Otherwise
quitters could be punished effectively by starting a new contract so that the other agent gets all the surplus
from the relationship. For example, in the Thomas-Worrall model this would imply that punishments are
as severe as consignment to trading on the spot marker, so the same set of contracts are self-enforcing.
29There is no cost to posting a vacancy, but only a ﬁxed fraction of the unemployed are able to make a
match, or rather, to ‘see’ wage offers (i.e. they are nor directly matched, but are able to enter into a contract,
whereas the unlucky ones cannot). This implies that the unemployment rate does not vary. Essentially he
posits a matching function where the matching or “seeing” probability does not depend on the number
of vacancies but only on the number seeking work. Moreover, although each entrepreneur can only match
withasingleworker,therearemoreentrepreneursthanworkerssothatcompetitionbetweenentrepreneurs
for the fraction of unemployed workers who can see offers drives proﬁts down to zero.
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Each worker has a total time endowment which is normalized to one, and can sup-
ply up to this amount to a single ﬁrm at any date. The productivity per hour worked
is z(st) at time t, which is common to all ﬁrms. However there is also a match speciﬁc
shock, which can reduce productivity to zero (where it remains). If this happens, the













where cj is consumption and Hj is hours supplied at time j. With separable preferences
theupdatingruleof(9)inSection2.2impliesthateachstate s ∈S isassociatedminimum
and maximum earnings,
¯
Ws and ¯ Ws (
¯
Ws ≤ ¯ Ws), such that earnings are kept constant if
possible and otherwise move by the smallest amount to
¯
Ws or ¯ Ws. In addition earnings
and hours satisfy equation (7) that the marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal
product. With the separable speciﬁcation of preference given above, it follows that
(wt+1Ht+1)B (1−Ht+1)
−η = z(st).
Notice that under a full commitment contract with these preferences a risk-neutral ﬁrm
will stabilize total earnings while hours will vary procyclically with productivity (accord-





that all income is labor income and there are no taxes, and maintaining the assumption
of no borrowing/saving). In this case hours do not vary at all with the wage or produc-
tivity (this contradicts the positive correlation between hours and productivity typically
found in the data).
As described in Section 2.2 the situation will, however, be somewhat different when
there are enforcement constraints, and the result is a mixing of the above two extremes.
For relatively small changes in productivity (and assuming that earnings are not already
up against the constraint that tightens) such that wtHt ∈ [
¯
Wst+1, ¯ Wst+1], so neither con-
straintisbindingwithstrictlypositiveshadowvalue,therulesaysthatearningsstaycon-
stant, so there is no income effect, and hours change with productivity according to the
intertemporal elasticity of supply. On the other hand, if the change is large enough that
a constraint binds, then earnings change and there will be an income effect which re-
duces to an extent the change in hours. For example, a large increase in productivity
may imply only a small increase in hours if earnings rise substantially, so the wage will
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also rise.30 In this case there is a positive correlation. The overall effect may then be that
the correlation is very weak, in accordance with the evidence.
Rudanko (2006) also embeds the basic model in a model of search. She addresses
issues recently raised by Shimer (2005) who argues that the Mortensen-Pissarides model
cannot account for the magnitude of unemployment and vacancy ﬂuctuations without
assuming an unrealistically high volatility in productivity. Hall (2005) argues that some
form of wage rigidity may be sufﬁcient to solve this puzzle. The Sigouin model holds
unemployment and vacancies ﬁxed, so cannot address these issues. Rudanko looks at
different versions of a contracting model in a directed search model of the labor market,
following Moen (1997), rather than the random matching model typically used in this
literature. The model has similarities with the Sigouin model in that match speciﬁc pro-
ductivity is composed (as the product of) a common (economy wide) component and
match component that is unity initially, but transits to an absorbing state of 0 with a
ﬁxed probability each period. As in Sigouin, when this occurs, the match dissolves and
the worker looks for a new job. Likewise there are a large number of risk-neutral en-
trepreneurs operating under constant returns to scale. (Unlike Sigouin, however, hours
are ﬁxed, although in the US the extensive margin is more important in accounting for
total hours variation than the intensive one.) The model is one of competitive search:
At the start of each period, after observing the current aggregate productivity level, ﬁrms
can choose to post an offer of a wage contract, but have to pay a cost k for keeping a
vacancy open. Worker search can be directed to a particular wage contract σ. There is
a matching function deﬁned as follows: if there is a measure Nu of unemployed agents
searching for σ and measure Nv of vacancies offering σ, the measure of matches taking




where 0 < K < 1 and 0 < α < 1. Deﬁning θ = Nv/Nu to be the vacancy unemployment
ratio (“labor market tightness”), the probability that a worker ﬁnds a contract σ this pe-
riod is m(θ) := m(Nu,Nv)/Nu, and the corresponding probability for an entrepreneur is






where Vσ(z) is the discounted worker utility from ﬁnding a job with contract σ, while
Vu(z) is the corresponding utility from being unemployed, where both are functions of
the prevailing aggregate state z. Vu(z) is the discounted utility from consuming the un-
employment beneﬁt today and searching again tomorrow. Likewise Vσ(z) is just the ex-
pression given in the original model for contract utility with a stochastic termination
30This depends on how [
¯
Wst+1, ¯ Wst+1] varies with zt+1 but Sigouin shows through numerical simulations
that the intuition will be correct in many situations.
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added, at which point the worker gets Vu
¡
z0¢
if z0 is the current state as she is unem-
ployed for a period and then has to seek a new job. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt per job will depend
on the probability that a job is ﬁlled, q(θ), and equals q(θ(z))Fσ(z)−k where Fσ(z) is
the discounted proﬁt from σ achieved if a match occurs and where k is the vacancy cost
which must be incurred whether or not a match is made. With competition amongst
entrepreneurs, this proﬁt is driven to zero in equilibrium. The self-enforcing constraints
specify that a worker cannot gain by leaving the contract, which requires that continua-
tionutilitymustnotbebelowVu(z0)(theworkerisunemployedforatleastaperiod),and
againthatthe continuationproﬁtsofthe entrepreneurarenon-negative. Inaddition, for
equilibrium to obtain it must be the case that there is no other contract that could be
offered which would offer greater proﬁts, where the corresponding θ will equate the re-
turnstoworkersfromsearchingineithermarket.31 AsinSigouin,themodelendogenizes
the worker’s outside option so that it depends on what she would get by starting a new
contract, but again the risk of unemployment (here it will last at least one period) is a
sufﬁcient deterrent to allow non-spot contracts to be sustained.
The model is calibrated to U.S. data, and the volatilities of real wages and of the
vacancy/unemployment ratio are analyzed. Not surprisingly, if there is commitment in
the wage contract then wages vary too little with productivity (only new matches are re-
sponsible for any variability). The model only comes close to matching the respective
empirical correlations of the wage and the vacancy/unemployment ratio with produc-
tivity in the two-sided limited commitment model if the replacement ratio is around
80%, which is considerably higher than usually assumed (although Rudanko argues that
this is not necessarily an unreasonable number). Intuitively, to get the wage to vary suf-
ﬁciently, the worker’s outside option constraint must bind sufﬁciently frequently; this
requires workers to be relatively indifferent between working and not working.32
3.2. One-sided limited commitment
WenextconsidertheinﬂuentialpaperbyBeaudry&DiNardo(1991)(hereafterBD91).
They develop a model of labor contracting where a risk-neutral ﬁrm offers insurance to
risk-averseemployees,butthereisnoworkercommitmentandunlikethesearchmodels
consideredaboveaworkerwhoquitscanimmediatelystartworkelsewhere(perfectmo-
bility). In terms of our model above, they assume that Cf = ∞ (ﬁrm commitment) and
Cw = 0 with χw(st) given by the utility from starting a new job (perfect labor mobility).
We derive their basic characterization, which is a generalization of Holmstrom (1983)
who considered a two-period model. We then describe the other ingredients of their
31Rudanko shows that only a single contract is ever offered to new matches in equilibrium. Moreover, it
is equivalent to a model with undirected search in which a weighted Nash product of surpluses (relative to
(Vu (z),0)) is maximized, with weights proportional to the exponents in the matching function, i.e., α and
1−α. So the competitive search framework appears not to be crucial to the results.
32The model actually does better as risk aversion tends to zero; this may be taken as support for the type
of hold-up model analyzed by MacLeod & Malcomson (1993).
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model which lead to empirically testable predictions, and ﬁnally we discuss the empir-
ical evidence. Their work is particularly important for two reasons. First, they provide
strong evidence in favor of the perfect mobility model. Secondly, the paper addresses
how wages respond to unemployment levels over the business cycle. There is a volumi-
nous literature that examines how real wages respond to contemporaneous movements
in unemployment which generally has not found a very strong relationship, but the re-
sults in BD91 suggest that this literature may have been looking at the wrong business
cycle variable. If one looks at the lowest unemployment rate since a worker started a job,
this appears to show a much stronger effect.33
Given that Cf = ∞, we can treat the value of ¯ ws derived in Section 2.1 as being
inﬁnite. (Alternatively,wecanjustignoretheﬁrm’sconstraintinalltheabovearguments,
so Lemma 1 directly asserts that wages cannot fall, etc.). Thus the intervals for efﬁcient
wages become [
¯
ws,∞). The ratchet nature of wages follows from Proposition 1: wt+1 =
¯
wst+1 if wt <
¯
wst+1, and otherwise wt+1 = wt. To pin down the values for the
¯
ws, we need
to specify the process for χw(st) and how the contractual surplus is split between worker
and ﬁrm.
BD91 assume that there are a large number of identical ﬁrms and workers, with
new workers entering each period to replenish the labor force, replacing workers who
die.34 It is assumed further that because ﬁrms operate under constant returns to scale,
competition for workers drives proﬁts for a new worker to zero, so any surplus goes to
the worker. A worker who quits a ﬁrm can immediately seek employment with another
ﬁrm. Moreover the only source of uncertainty is the common shock to productivity each
period. What this implies is that χw(st), the utility of the worker’s outside option, equals
the utility from an optimal contract which generates zero proﬁts.35 Given the updating
rule, it is then possible to calculate the initial wage of a contract starting in state s for




What is perhaps surprising at ﬁrst glance is how it is possible to offer any insur-
ance at all when the worker can quit and restart the contract at a different ﬁrm, without
33Asbeforeweassumethatworkersdonotengageincapitalmarkettransactions. Thisisnotaninnocuous
assumption when the insurance offered by the contract is partial as the workers may wish to supplement
the insurance through borrowing even when the capital market is imperfect. A two-period model that does
consider access to imperfect capital markets is Haltiwanger & Waldman (1986). In their model where work-
ers learn their true productivity in the second period, they are able to show wages offer some insurance in
the second period, rising if either high or low productivity is revealed. They show that this may help explain
the positive correlation between experience and compensation in the absence of changes in productivity as
a result of experience.
34BD91 also have ﬁrm death, but we shall abstract from this in the exposition that follows.
35BD91 express the worker’s participation constraint equivalently as the fact that the contract must never
offer strictly positive proﬁts, looking forward from any point—if it did then the worker would be bid away.
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any penalty.36 Normally in repeated game models of cooperation players are induced to
take short-term sub-optimal actions (such as paying out on insurance) by the promise
of long-term rewards relative to reneging on this, which yields termination. But here a
worker who quits is able to immediately start a new contract with a different ﬁrm so that
whenever productivity is such that the contract demands a sacriﬁce by the worker, the
worker can quit. The resolution of this apparent paradox is that contracts require that
workers initially receive a wage below productivity. Thus workers are effectively making
transfers ﬁrms in the early periods of the contract. These early transfers are compen-
sated by the likelihood of wages above productivity as wages will tend to increase over
time.37,38
In order to get testable restrictions, it is necessary to link the productivity level in
the theoretical model to an observable variable. Notice that the optimal wage contract
depends only on the productivity process—a very convenient feature. Moreover the la-
bor market must always clear, since at the point of hiring there are no restrictions on
wages. However when productivity is high, the wage and expected utility for a new en-
trant is high. BD91 posit an alternative sector in which a worker could be employed
which is subject to a (ﬁxed) decreasing returns technology. Thus a new entrant to the
labor market faces a choice between a period in the alternative sector and then getting
a contract, versus getting a contract in the original sector right away (by construction
of the equilibrium, once a worker has a contract, the option of moving to the alterna-
tive sector will offer the same as a new contract, and so is always weakly dominated due
to the participation constraint). In equilibrium workers will be indifferent (there are al-
ways some workers employed in the alternative sector) so a high wage in the original
sector must positively related to a high wage in the alternative sector and hence low lev-
elsofemploymentinthealternativesector(becauseofdecreasingreturns). BD91equate
a low level of employment in the alternative sector with low unemployment rate in the
economy and hence conclude that a low level of unemployment will be associated with
higher wages in the current and subsequent periods.39
BD91 conclude, then, that with no worker commitment (perfect mobility), where
the worker is free to quit at any point, the wage follows a ratchet like process, rising
wheneverthelabormarketistighterthanhitherto(sincetheworkerjoinedtheﬁrm), but
staying constant otherwise; hence the current wage is determined by the tightest labor
36Infactthisintuitioniscorrectinthetwo-sidedcasewheretheﬁrmcouldalsoterminatetherelationship
costlessly. In the Sigouin and Rudanko models discussed above, there is the possibility of unemployment if
a worker quits, and this is sufﬁcient to support non-trivial contracts.
37This issue has been explored by Krueger & Uhlig (2006) in a general risk sharing context where both
parties to the contract are risk-averse.
38The feature that workers initially receive wages below productivity with a rising wage proﬁle is of course
reminiscent of the agency models where rising wages provide incentives for effort, see e.g. Lazear (1981).
39It is tempting to interpret the alternative sector as leisure or some sort of household production, al-
though the decreasing returns to total labor input makes this interpretation difﬁcult.
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market during a worker’s tenure. Tightness of the labor market is measured by how low
the unemployment rate is. In testing, this perfect mobility model does better than two
alternatives: a spot market model in which current unemployment determines wages,
and a full commitment model in which unemployment at the time of hiring is the de-
termining factor. In the spot market model, wages are determined solely by the value of
a worker’s current marginal product, in the full commitment contracting model, wages
are constant but the level is determined by the worker’s outside opportunity at the point
at which she joins the ﬁrm. Beaudry & DiNardo (1991) test these three models against
each other on U.S. data (PSID/Current Population Survey (CPS)). Perhaps surprisingly,
the latter model appears to perform much better than the other two, which we describe
in more detail:
Commitment: a binding contract is signed when the worker joins a ﬁrm. Because
theworkerisrisk-averse, therisk-neutralﬁrmactsasaninsurancecompany, completely
stabilizing wages. (This results from our above general model by imposing Cw = ∞, so
that
¯
ws = −∞.) In equilibrium workers will be offered a ﬁxed wage contract (where the
wage will equal the expected discounted value of a worker’s productivity so ﬁrms make
zero proﬁts). The wage will be ﬁxed at a level corresponding to conditions at the point
the worker joins the ﬁrm—it equals the best estimate of a worker’s lifetime productivity,
and under the assumed productivity process this will depend only on her productivity at
this point, which is, as explained above, proxied by the unemployment rate, Ut, at that
point.
Spot market contract: no long-term contract is possible, so this implies that wt =
z(st). (If a ﬁrm offered say a ﬁxed wage contract, then whenever the wage was less than
z(st) the worker could just walk away, and go to another ﬁrm, while if the wage was
greater than z(st) the ﬁrm could sack the worker.) Thus wages ﬂuctuate with z(st) which
is proxied byUt.
The general model can be expressed as follows: the natural log of the real wage for
worker j at time τ+t for a worker who started the job at time τ satisﬁes:
lnwj,τ+t =α1Xj,τ+t +α2C(τ,t)+εj,τ+t
where Xj,τ+t is a vector of individual variables40, α1 is the vector of coefﬁcients on these
variables, εj,τ+t is an error term, and α2 is the coefﬁcient on the business cycle (i.e.,
unemployment) variable, with the 3 possibilities for the business cycle variable C(τ,t)
40For individual characteristics, BD91 used experience, experience squared, how much schooling, job
tenure, and dummies for industry, region, race, union status, marriage, and metropolitan area (SMSA).






Uτ+t spot market model
Uτ fully binding contract
min{Uτ+k,k =0,1,...,t} non-binding on worker
where the unemployment rate is denoted byU, withUτ the rate prevailing at the start of
the job andUτ+t the rate at time τ+t where t denotes tenure with the employer.
The results are striking. In some speciﬁcations41 in which all three variables are in-
cluded, the coefﬁcient on the minimum unemployment rate is the only correctly signed
(i.e., negative) signiﬁcant one (PSID, no ﬁxed effects), and in all speciﬁcations it is much
larger than the other coefﬁcients, implying that a 1% drop in the minimum unemploy-
ment rate (e.g., from 4% to 3%) leads to an increase in current wages of between 3% and
8%.
The implications for our understanding of real wage cyclicality are considerable.
Typically studies have looked at how wages respond to contemporaneous unemploy-
ment movements. For example, using the PSID for men over the period of 1968–69 to
86–87, Solon, Barsky & Parker (1994) found that a one percentage point reduction of the
unemployment rate leads to a rise in the real wage rate of workers who stayed in their
jobsby1.2percent(moversappeartobesubjecttogreaterprocyclicalwagemovements).
Similar estimates are found in Shin (1994) and Devereux (2001). BD91’s results suggest
that the response of wages to the minimum unemployment rate is substantially larger.
Ontheotherhand,asarguedinGrant(2003),becausetheminimumunemploymentrate
does not actually vary as much as contemporaneous unemployment (consider a worker
whose minimum value occurred early in a job spell), minimum unemployment may not
explain very much of the variability of aggregate wages over the business cycle.
Several recent empirical studies have largely conﬁrmed the robustness of BD91’s
mainempiricalﬁndingsoverdifferentperiodsandusingdifferentdatasets,thatthemin-
imum rate of unemployment since hiring is a statistically important determinant of the
current wage of an individual (McDonald & Worswick 1999, Grant 2003, Shin & Shin
2007, Devereux & Hart 2007). Both Grant (2003), and Devereux & Hart (2007), however,
ﬁnd more of a role for the current unemployment rate than did BD91. Grant (2003) ex-
tendsBD91’sanalysis(usingsixcohortsfromtheNationalLongitudinalSurveys)tocover
the time period 1966 to 1998. He ﬁnds that the signiﬁcance and importance of minu is
broadly robust with respect to the addition of ﬁxed time dummies (to rule out any ef-
fects coming through macroeconomic variables, and thus the coefﬁcient on minu is es-
timated only through variation across individuals in each year), of tenure dummies (to
capture nonlinear tenure effects), a tenure-unemployment interaction term (to capture
tenure effects that vary over the business cycle), and using sub-samples selected on the
41See Table 2 of their paper.
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basis of age, and sex. As mentioned, however, current unemployment levels also have
some explanatory power.
A somewhat different methodology was adopted by Shin & Shin (2007), using the
PSID for the period 1974–91, which includes one business cycle more than BD91. They
runtheBD91regressionsoverthewholeperiodandgetverysimilarresults—butasGrant
does, they also ﬁnd more signiﬁcant results for contemporaneous unemployment.42,43
They also estimate a complementary econometric model, only using the current unem-
ployment rate as a business cycle regressor, but look for asymmetric effects of tight labor
markets. Thus they split a job history into periods of tightening and loosening labor
markets, and subdivide the former category into two sub-categories, when unemploy-
ment is falling but above its minimum for the current job, and when it is below the min-
imum. Tenure is measured with considerable error in the PSID; thus a mismeasurement
in tenure may lead to an incorrect value for minu, used in BD91’s estimation, whereas
here it will lead to the respective periods when unemployment is falling but below or
respectively above the historical minimum, to be measured incorrectly. It is argued that
the former is more likely to be problematical. The results are that most of the wage ad-
justment occurs in periods when the unemployment rate falls below the historical mini-
mum level observed since the start of the current job in accordance with the perfect mo-
bility model (according to the model, wages should be constant in other periods): For
the sample of male household heads, the estimated coefﬁcient on the unemployment
rate is -0.026 (i.e., a one percentage point reduction in the unemployment rate is asso-
ciated with a 2.64 percent rise in real wages). The coefﬁcient on unemployment when
it is falling but not below the historical minimum is much smaller at -.0076, but not sig-
niﬁcant. For periods of contraction, the coefﬁcient is smaller and insigniﬁcant. So again
there is a strong conﬁrmation of the perfect mobility model. They also conﬁrm the ﬁnd-
ings of other studies that the wages of job stayers are procyclical, but less so than those
of movers.
42In comparing their estimates with those of Grant, it is interesting to note that the PSID sample has a
higher average age than the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth used by Grant except for the NLSY Older
Men. Estimates in Table 2 of Grant (2003) show that the effect of the minimum unemployment rate on
current wages dominates those of the other unemployment variables more in the NLSY “Older Men” cohort
than in “Young Men” or “Women,” and the “Older Men” results are closest to the PSID estimates. This
suggests that the BD91 model may work better for older workers.
43Shin & Shin (2007) include a trend, which might matter as the period studied has a generally rising
unemployment rate, so that the a job’s minimum unemployment rate is negatively correlated with time
elapsed since the date at which the minimum is attained; as wages are rising omitting this trend might
overstate the effect of the minimum unemployment rate. However it makes little difference, as one would
anticipate from Grant’s analysis with time dummies. Likewise, to rule out nonlinear effects of tenure they
ﬁnd that the addition a squared tenure term does not matter to the worker ﬁxed effect model (although it
does to the no-ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation); again this conﬁrms Grant’s ﬁndings.
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4. CLOSING COMMENTS
We presented an overview of models of self-enforcing labor contracts in which risk
sharingisthedominantmotiveforcontractualsolutions. Abasictwo-agent(ﬁrm-worker)
model was developed which is sufﬁciently general to encompass the problem consid-
ered in most of the literature. We have shown how the solution can be characterized
usinglocalvariationalargumentsandthereforeavoidedtheneedtoestablishmorecom-
plex technical properties of optimum value functions. We have considered how the out-
side option of the worker is made endogenous in competitive or search markets and
considered some of the implications for aggregate hours and wages and productivity
and what empirical support exists for the model. The broad conclusion is that the self-
enforcing contractual model does help explain some of the observed empirical regular-
ities better than a spot market or full commitment alternatives. There is fairly strong
support from a variety of sources and data of the one-sided limited commitment model
where workers outside options are determined competitively.
There remain some issues for further study. A weakness of the empirical tests has
been to discriminate against alternative assumptions of capital market imperfections,
such as credit constraints for employees, or alternative contracting explanations based
on hold-up rather than risk aversion. The general success of the empirical method how-
ever suggests that it will be useful to explore whether the model can help explain ob-
served patterns in wages at the ﬁrm level where it is typically found that larger ﬁrms pay
higher wages and fast growing ﬁrms pay lower wages. An approach along these lines
combining contracts with ﬁrm credit constraints can be found in Michelacci & Quadrini
(2005).
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